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Adolescence versus Politics: 
Metaphors in Late Colonial Uganda
Carol Summers
In 1943, Bishop Cyril Stuart, head of the Native Anglican Church of Uganda, 
tried to explain his own unpopularity and make sense of Uganda’s ongoing 
political crises by asserting that the country was full of “lovable people” who 
were in a “very difficult adolescent stage.”1 The bishop was describing a spe­
cific challenging political context in Uganda. The frame of adolescence that 
he used, though, was much larger. This was not a casual reference; the bishop 
was drawing on a vision of empire and change rooted in the social sciences 
rather than in the older metaphors that undergirded systems of indirect rule 
and deployed languages of racial difference or portrayed a parental Britain 
saving its vulneraole child-subjects. This social-science metaphor of promis­
ing but difficult adolescence, and its associated ideas of tumultuous matura­
tion and stages of growth, allowed British colonial actors to think about 
politics and change in psychosocial terms. These replaced both older essen- 
tialist categories and newer Marxist economic analyses of exploitation and 
class struggle with an overtly apolitical idea of organic (if disruptive and loud) 
political change. Within this new frame, progressive imperialists argued for 
an ongoing and even intensified engagement with the protesting people of the 
empire, an engagement that became known as a second colonial occupation. 
Protests were heard not as descriptive statements of literal misrule or abuse, 
but as signs of adolescent maturation, a stage that would pass and would
1 Bishop Cyril Stuart to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30-10-43 CMS G3 A7 d l, 
Church Missionary Society Archives, Birmingham University, Birmingham, UK.
Copyright by Journal of the History of ideas, Volume 78, Number 1 {January 2017)
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eventually yield a newly adult people, grateful for their parents’ care. Thus 
protests were understood as auspicious signals of Britain’s successful nurture 
of a maturing people, rather than as dire markers of the people’s poverty and 
the British empire’s failures.
This British deployment of metaphors of adolescence differed mark­
edly from the French rhetoric of the era, which recognized the adulthood 
of the colonized and the possibility of adult citizenship, even when arguing 
over biological children of mixed ancestry.2 Even during the Vichy years, 
when assimilationist ideas were eclipsed, French administrators did not 
portray Africans as less than adults.3 Beyond Vichy, the African labor activ­
ists and soldiers that Frederick Cooper and Gregory Mann have discussed, 
and the anticolonial migrants Michael Goebel has described in Paris’s 
streets, salons, and coffee shops, were seen as adults and included citizens 
and savvy negotiators such as Lamine Gueye and Leopold Senghor.4
The British Empire of the mid-twentieth century, however, struggled 
with its own rhetoric and ideals. Asian moves toward self-rule and increas­
ing levels of autonomy from the dominions diminished Britain’s status at a 
time when austerity and reconstruction at home limited its economic ability 
to assert global power. Racist and paternalistic ideas of empire were being 
explicitly challenged by the Atlantic Charter and new rhetorics of human 
rights.5 Tensions between the US and the Soviet Union offered an opportu­
nity to view the world in Cold War terms, but rhetoric about the dangers 
of communism in Africa mostly fell flat. Uganda’s conservative governor 
Sir John Hall, increasingly nervous about the security situation during the 
late 1940s, at times tried to discredit activists by labeling them communists, 
only to be mocked by Semakula Mulumba, his loudest critic, who declared, 
“There are no Communists in Uganda. We are not Communists. The 
Uganda people do not know the meaning of Communism. They do, how­
ever, know that the Governor, who is not a ‘Communist,’ treats them
2 See, for example, Emmanueile Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizen­
ship in the French Colonies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2012).
3 Eric T. Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Petain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, 
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 
20-78.
4 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and 
French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Gregory Mann, 
Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006); and Michael Goebel, The Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar 
Paris and the Seeds o f Third World Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015).
5 Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1979 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2009), 101-14.
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badly.”* With visions of class struggle and revolutionary war against 
exploitation and oppression, popular ideas of communism risked ex­
acerbating Ugandan tensions in ways neither British administrators nor 
Ugandan activists found appealing.
In the 1940s and into the 1950s, British administrators and intellectual 
and religious leaders within Uganda, an economically dynamic but politi­
cally challenging protectorate, found the metaphor of adolescence both fit­
ting and very useful. This vocabulary drew on and contributed to a global, 
cosmopolitan social-science literature of psychology and social maturation. 
British leaders in Uganda made that vocabulary local through the hap­
hazard initiatives of the bishop and more systematic work by the social 
scientists of the East African Institute for Social Research. Within this 
framework, they built local analyses that allowed them to reject the politi­
cal critiques and clashing claims of local political debates. The metaphor of 
adolescence worked against politics based in individual citizenship, rights, 
or class struggle, and instead reframed tensions as a blameless and tempo­
rary family drama.
Beyond Uganda, sociology and psychology, rather than older forms of 
observational cultural anthropology, had become increasingly prominent 
parts of colonial discourse during and after World War II. George Stein- 
metz, for example, has emphasized that the period from the 1940s through 
the 1960s was formative for British sociology, which eclipsed anthropology 
in the late colonial world. Sociologists sought explicitly to analyze social 
structures as well as the challenges of modernization that were larger and 
messier than anthropological analyses. Anthropological analyses remained 
smaller in scale, tied to culture, ethnicities, and governing principles of indi­
rect rule.6 7 Understanding colonial minds was also a central aim of the era’s 
new psychological investigations, according to Erik Linstrum. With new 
tools such as color wheels and tachitoscopes, psychological researchers 
experimented to test how people perceived, thought, and reacted in cultures 
such as those of the Torres Straits, far removed from Britain. Such invest­
igations often found ranges of variation among colonial subjects that 
paralleled findings from Britain, supporting broader normative ideas of 
humanity against older racial categories. Laboratory findings contributed 
to practical innovations in military assignments and eventually even in
6 Semakula Mulumba, “Commentary on the Replies of the Colonial Secretary,” Novem­
ber 24, 1950, CO 537/581, British National Archives, Kew, London.
7 George Steinmetz, “A Child of the Empire: British Sociology and Colonialism, 1940s- 
1960s,” Journal o f the History o f the Behavioral Sciences 49, no. 4 (2013): 353-78.
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counterinsurgency and community development, where group therapy 
ideals provided the basis for attempts at remaking colonial authority to 
“minimize transference” and downplay hierarchy.8
The context of modernizing social sciences that shaped a new sociology 
and psychology brought forward not just the investigative methods and 
disciplinary infrastructure Linstrum and Steinmetz have described, but new 
concepts as well. Significantly, during the early twentieth century social sci­
entists built the category of adolescence, working to understand changing 
social realities in the United States, Britain, and beyond through a concept 
advocates assumed would have a broader relevance. Sociologist G. Stanley 
Hall’s Adolescence, published in 1904, depicted a new, modern stage of life 
that had physiological and psychological, anthropological and sociological 
implications. Adolescence was, in this early discussion, both something 
everyone experienced and a topic that required attention to ethnic differen­
tiation. Even in his pioneering work, Hall made clear that the concept went 
beyond the individual: he referred as well to “adolescent races,” discussing 
their needs for teaching and treatment.9 In subsequent years, publications 
on adolescence proliferated, positioning the concept as central to analyses 
not simply by academic sociologists, but by professionals ranging from 
school teachers to psychologists and beyond. The concept Hall built was 
not simply a biological or psychological given. He emphasized how a new 
modernity had reshaped experiences of maturation. By the 1940s, colonial 
leaders used the concept as a metaphor to dismiss African politicians as 
disruptive adolescents, going beyond Hall’s emphasis on adolescence as a 
stage of individuals’ lives occasioned by social modernity.10 “Adolescence” 
became a way to explain how people and societies collectively experienced 
social and political change.
Metaphorical narratives have offered historical actors means to make 
sense of their contexts; they have also structured, and at times overwritten, 
alternative interpretations of complex events.* 11 The individuals who de­
ployed the idea of adolescence went beyond a description of biological mat­
uration or generational transition to draw on the metaphor’s vision of
8 Erik Linstrum, Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), esp. 13-42, 155-65.
9 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthro­
pology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1904).
10 Sir Philip Mitchell, cited in Linstrum, Ruling Minds, 171.
11 See, for example, Severine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the 
Congo and their Unintended Consequences,” African Affairs (2012): 202-22.
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tumultuous psychological maturation. They treated adolescence and youth 
as a key aspect of political clashes and of hopes for the future. 12 This article 
thus discusses adults who talked about adolescence rather than focusing on 
either real children or policymaking for children. 13
Uganda’s own African politicians used more complicated metaphors 
of childhood, maturation, generational rights, and parental inefficiency, 
rejecting the simplified dismissal of their grievances implicit in the concept 
of adolescence. Within Uganda, African politics included occasional pro­
tests by youth and by ambitious junior men excluded from Buganda’s oli­
garchic officeholding leadership. Some of these activists aligned themselves 
with their grandfathers to call for the stewardship of Buganda’s resources, 
while others drew on older Ganda ideas of generational transition tied to 
the king’s life cycle to emphasize the need to challenge and remake the 
kingdom of Buganda at a time when a young king was beginning to rule. 14 
Uganda’s activists of all ages invoked youth occasionally, but emphasized 
inheritance and citizenship. They critiqued greedy leaders and inadequate 
British patronage. They did not consider their concerns to be childish or 
adolescent.
It was British observers who invoked the metaphor of adolescence. 
They drew on it, investigated it specifically through research in Uganda, 
and deployed it to explain clashes over development, imperial power, and 
local opportunities. The metaphor’s psychosocial imagery defended Brit­
ain’s role and deflected blame or accountability. The presence and persis­
tence of ideas of adolescence in Uganda offer a guide to the mental world 
of late colonial power. A focus on that metaphor allows us to see beyond 
the messy, complicated event history of the era to the ways that the era’s 
religious leaders, social scientists, and administrators used this key concept 
both to understand and to explain away the troubling political implications 
of the period’s clashes.
12 Carol Summers, “Young Buganda and Old Boys: Youth, Generational Transition, and 
Ideas of Leadership in Buganda, 1920-1949,” Africa Today 3 (2005): 109-28.
13 See, for example, Beverly Grier, Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial 
Zimbabwe (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2006), and Abosede A. George, Making 
Modern Girls: A History o f Girlhood, Labor, and Social Development in Colonial Lagos 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), as well as Ellen Boucher, Empire’s Children: Child 
Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline o f the British World, 1869-1967 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), and David M. Pomfret, Youth and Empire: Trans- 
Colonial Childhoods in British and Trench Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press 
2015).
14 Summers, “Youth, Elders and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial 
Buganda,” in Generations Past: Youth in East African History, ed. Andrew Burton and 
Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 175-95.
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UGANDANS AS ADOLESCENTS
By the end of World War II, Uganda’s administration, its missionaries, and 
the colonial office back in London had mostly gotten over any ideas they 
might have had that Ugandans were simply innocent children who could be 
protected and guided to maturity by a paternal British Empire. The protec­
torate was, after all, centered in Buganda, a kingdom run by a canny elite 
that had aggressively negotiated for power in Buganda and over Uganda 
even as they accepted formal loyalty to the Queen of England. Even the 
losers in that 1900 negotiation process had gone on to engage in vigorous 
and ultimately successful negotiations that led to the reclamation of Bataka 
(clan) lands and a cautious attitude by British administrators that persisted 
throughout the colonial years.15 Political mobilization by the Sons of Kintu, 
the Motor Drivers’ Association, the Bataka Union, the Cotton Growers’ 
Association, and other groups from the 1930s through the 1950s, as well 
as the growth of a vigorous and critical Luganda press, forced administra­
tors and British experts to acknowledge the variety and complexity of 
Uganda’s political scene, which they documented copiously in intelligence 
reports and sought to interpret with cutting-edge expertise from interna­
tional social scientists.16
Increasing political mobilization and effective Ganda leadership during 
and after the war challenged British imperial authority. British observers 
struggled to explain chaotic and high-profile school strikes in 1941, espe­
cially at the country’s elite school, King’s College Budo.17 They witnessed a 
general strike in 1945 that immobilized Kampala and attacked “progres­
sive” gentlemen such as Buganda’s treasurer, Serwano Kulubya. They read 
complaints about British administration in local papers and in pamphlets
15 Holly Hanson, Landed Obligation: The Practice o f Power in Buganda (Portsmouth, 
N.H.: Heinemann, 2004).
16 On early political successes, see Hanson, Landed Obligation. On late colonial political 
associations, see Summers, “Radical Rudeness: Ugandan Social Critiques during the 
1940s,” Journal o f Social History 39, no. 3 (2006): 741-70; Summers, “Grandfathers, 
Grandsons, Morality, and Radical Politics in Late Colonial Buganda,” International Jour­
nal o f African Historical Studies 38, no. 3 (2005): 427-47; and Summers, “Catholic 
Action and Ugandan Radicalism: Political Activism in Buganda, 1930-1950,” Journal o f 
Religion in Africa 39, no. 1 (2009): 60-90. For official discussion, see CO 537/4342, 
British National Archives, Kew, London. On the East African Social Institute for Social 
Research at Makerere University, see D. A. Low, “Uganda: Makerere and Sir Andrew 
Cohen in the 1950s,” [1984?] undated typescript, MSS Afr s 1825, Rhodes House 
Library, Oxford University.
17 Summers, “ ‘Subterranean Evil’ and ‘Tumultuous Riot’ in Buganda: Authority and 
Alienation at King’s College, Budo, 1942,” Journal o f African History 47 (2006): 93- 
113.
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and books, ranging from the Luganda Buganda nyaffe (Buganda our 
mother) to the English-language An African Soldier Speaks. And they 
examined the widespread destruction caused by the 1949 uprising in a 
regional context, comparing it to the greater violence of Kenya’s “Mau 
Mau mobilization and acknowledging that Uganda’s politics could get 
worse. Alarmed, they used courts, collective fines, deportations, and new 
propaganda techniques to seek to control an increasingly restive public. 
Most notably, they struggled with a young but increasingly defiant kabaka 
of Buganda, Mutesa II, who began to associate himself with the political 
activists of the kingdom rather than with his British foster parents after 
emerging from the regency of senior advisors. Deporting him at the end of 
1953 failed to calm Buganda’s politics, though, and instead offered a wide 
range of political figures an opportunity to come together in an ultimately 
successful campaign to force both local British protectorate officials and 
high-level bureaucrats and politicians in London to back down, seek help, 
and literally, somewhat desperately, rewrite the terms of Buganda’s rela­
tionship with Uganda in a new constitution before returning the much- 
strengthened king to Uganda.18
In such a chaotic context, the metaphor of Uganda’s adolescence 
proved helpful to British administrators and activists, particularly progres­
sive ones associated with liberalism and progressive Christianity (such as 
Bishop C. Stuart) and leftist politicians and professional activists (such as 
leftist M. P. Fenner Brockway and cooperatives expert Diane Noakes). 
Rebellion, chaos, ungratefulness, and demands to be left alone, in this met­
aphor, became no more than what would be expected of such a stage of 
maturity. Instead of needing to reconsider the persistence of British domina­
tion of church or government, or to blame themselves for provoking rebel­
lion tnrough lack of resources, abusive policies, or active misrule, liberal 
and Labour interpreters could thus transform scathingly abusive local polit­
ical rhetoric into something tolerable and perhaps expected of rebellious 
youth. Eventually, the metaphor of adolescence implied, Buganda’s leaders 
might stop referring to well-meaning Britons as white swine, bloodsuckers, 
and robbers—all terms notable in activists’ condemnations of British 
policy.19
Even in the short term, ideas of adolescence, with their psychological 
emphasis on stages of growth rather than exploitation, abuse, or other
18 Summers, “Youth, Elders and Metaphors.”
19 Dauci Musoke Mukibiira and Semakuia Mulumba, for example, in Low, ed., The Mind 
o f Buganda: Documents o f the Modem History o f an African Kingdom (Berkeley: Uni­
versity of California Press, 1971). See also Summers, “Radical Rudeness.”
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explanations for ungrateful and restive local political statements, offered 
the British a way of explaining why they sought to increase British invest­
ment and attention in a context where an articulate local political class 
was increasingly suspicious and resistant. British political and economic 
development policy in Uganda during the 1940s and 1950s was not a 
response to public demand. Economically successful already, Buganda’s 
core political activists of that era put their money and resources against an 
experimental cotton station, a campaign for land conservation through the 
cultivation of elephant grass, and the administration’s efforts to intervene 
in ginning and the cotton market. They actively resisted “Closer Union” for 
a larger political and economic development zone that would have united 
Uganda and Kenya, and opposed electing representatives of Buganda to the 
Uganda Protectorate’s Legislative Assembly. Even the land bill that permit­
ted the transformation of Makerere into a University College had been 
forced through Buganda’s Lukiiko (parliament) against public opinion, 
triggering the assassination of the prime minister, who had advocated for 
the university. In his visit to Buganda, Fenner Brockway found himself 
shocked both by local activists’ ability to organize and by their blunt rejec­
tion of the sorts of market interventions and government planning that Brit­
ain’s farmers had long accepted as progressive and constructive.20
Given such broad political opposition, British policy in the postwar 
years was thus bluntly anti-political even as it touted economic and political 
development and progress. But when facing effective opposition to initia­
tives rooted in expertise, development, and progress, intellectuals resorted 
to justifying their initiatives through a patronizing psychosocial language 
of adolescent rebellion and growth.
THE WORK OF A METAPHOR:
EVADING BLAME AND JUSTIFYING 
INTENSIFIED INTERVENTION
Anti-political politics appears, on the surface, to be an inherently contradic­
tory concept. Contradiction, though, is often important to ideological justi­
fications: the classic “war to end all wars” concept, along with today’s 
“peacekeeping” armies, illustrates this reality. More significant than its
20 Summers, “Local Critiques of Global Development: Patriotism and Power in Late 
Colonial Buganda,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 47, no. 1 (2014): 
21-35.
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internal contradictions was the congruence that specific aspects of the ado­
lescence metaphor offered to the resources, self-image, and ultimate goals 
of progressive imperial planners. This was important in an international 
atmosphere of nationalism, decolonization, development, and indepen­
dence. Older racial ideas of British superiority had faltered, looking suspi­
ciously akin to the racism espoused by the Nazis, a toxic resemblance only 
strengthened by the rise of white settlers’ racial initiatives in South Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya. Britain and the war-stressed British Empire 
no longer claimed economic and military superpower status in the increas­
ingly bipolar world of the Cold War. Unable to simply claim racial or civili- 
zational superiority, act as an all-powerful protector, or offer copious 
patronage, but needing its empire more than ever, Britain needed new ways 
to think about its imperial subjects—especially its restive and protesting 
subjects.21 Beginning in the 1940s and extending through the last years of 
the 1950s, the “second imperial occupation” of territories as diverse as 
settler Kenya and the Uganda Protectorate was principally justified by Brit­
ish participants and observers by Britain’s ability to bring development. 
Development—characterized as a technical, apolitical benefit—allowed 
Britain’s liberal, progressive, and socialist imperial activists to justify con­
tinued British rule, regardless of popular, and possibly democratic, agita­
tion against governors’ and administrators’ interventions. It allowed 
planners to substitute expertise for popularity or democracy.22
The problem for British planners, then, was to decide what sort of 
development was appropriate. The Russian Stalinist model of rapid indus­
trialization complete with centralized planning, ambitious quotas, and a 
willingness to sacrifice citizens to the nation was still, in the 1950s, viewed 
as a triumph by many even in Britain, and emulated by an ambitious Peo­
ple’s Republic of China in the Great Leap Forward. Such plans, though, 
required an explicit willingness to sacrifice and struggle. Sacrifice and 
struggle—mobilizing bakopi (ordinary people) against “kulaks,” poor 
peasants against rich peasants, and everyone against capitalists—did not 
fit easily into the British Empire. In the metropole, Fabian and academic 
socialism, with an emphasis on reformism and inquiry—technical, profes­
sional change rather than populism or revolution through violence— 
offered an alternative. Even politicians labeled as “radical” in the British
21 Summers, “Ugandan Politics after World War II,” Africa and World War II, ed. Judith 
A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 480-98.
22 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “D evelopm entD epoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
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context, such as Fenner Brockway, tended to emphasize cooperatives, trade 
unions, and familiar forms of political and economic action, rather than 
overt revolution.23
By the 1940s, in places such as Uganda, Britain had accepted that older 
ideas of indirect rule were inadequate and failed to fit local political reali­
ties. Ethnicity, chiefship, and “customary” legal systems remained occa­
sionally useful, as in Buganda when the cases of thousands of people 
arrested during the 1949 uprisings were tried by Buganda courts with 
adapted standards of evidence and testimony, rather than clogging protec­
torate courts into immobility. Increasingly aware protesters and critics 
objected to such uses of “tradition,” however. For the colonial thinkers of 
the 1940s and 1950s, there could be no dual mandate to preserve indige­
nous traditions and institutions while instructing in the ways of an ideal 
civilization.24
Unable to fall back on simple racism or ideas of indirect rule, British 
policymakers and politicians actively evaded being cast as the center of cap­
ital and exploitation by seeking to reinterpret and reshape conflicts. In 
Uganda, this meant that on occasion major socially and economically 
important conflicts were officially characterized as personality conflicts. 
The most notable of these was the 1945 general strike, which, as Gardner 
Thompson has noted, was summarized in an astonishingly incompetent 
investigative report that rejected any discussion of economics in favor of an 
interpretation based on personal rivalries and, according to a key East Afri­
can Institute for Social Research investigator, schoolboy politics.25 As 
unrest became even more widespread and complex, such dismissal of griev­
ances and politics became more difficult, but nevertheless persisted as offi­
cials described notable activists as elderly (in the case of clan heads such as 
Jemusi Miti), corrupt and ambitious (such as Ignatius Musazi and Sema- 
kula Mulumba) or immature and reckless (such as Abu Mayanja).26
23 See the Papers of the Movement for Colonial Freedom, SOAS special collections, Uni­
versity of London; and especially Diane Noakes to Fenner Brockway, 24-7-51, PP MS 56/ 
8, Diane Noakes papers, SOAS special collections; DO 35/4368 and extensive materials 
in CO 822, British National Archives, Kew, London.
24 See Frederick, Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwell and Sons, 1922). For Ugandan critique, see Sir Phillip Mitchell, in 
Low, Mind o f Buganda, 111-17.
25 Gardner Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945,” Afri­
can Affairs 91, no. 365 (1992): 605—24; E. M. K. Mulira, “The Legacy of Two Schools: 
Being a Historical Background to the Causes of Trouble in Uganda, in 1945,” [undated 
typescript, probably early 1945] EMKM KCB 1/1, Mulira Papers, African Studies Center, 
Cambridge University.
26 For example, files on Abu Mayanja FCO 141/18246 and J. W. Kiwanuka FCO 141/ 
18248, National Archives.
126
Summers ♦  Metaphors in Late Colonial Uganda
British administrators thus sent or encouraged experts in trade union­
ism to go to imperial hinterlands to teach appropriate forms of worker 
struggle, making clear that political analysis, strategy, and action could not 
be left to local activists, however successful; those activists had in fact won 
war bonuses in the 1945 strike, successfully challenged Indians’ monopolies 
on cotton ginning in 1949 and retrieved their king through a sophisticated 
and complex protest and publicity campaign after the 1953 Kabaka Crisis. 
The tactical successes of local Ugandan forms of protest and politics unset­
tled British observers and even their allies in the kingdom of Buganda, pro­
voking reinterpretation and intervention.
By describing Africans as adolescents, British observers acknowledged 
the obvious. Ugandans were not children. They were awake, aware, vocal, 
and blaming British administration for a range of problems. Within the 
metaphor of adolescence, though, such rebelliousness could be seen as 
without cause—as a stage in the protestors’ maturation rather than being 
provoked by British malpractice. Adolescent protesters had not been forced 
into rebellion by capital or imperial exploitation; rather, they rebelled and 
engaged in risky behavior simply as ways of trying to decide who they were. 
And it was up to the aging empire not to be hurt or to resort to discipline, 
but to channel that rebellion into psychological and social maturation 
through guided forms of political development. At times, this meant helping 
those that insulted the parental power. At times, it meant setting firm 
boundaries. Overall, it meant channeling more resources to gradually 
maturing people and institutions, whether those be universities, develop­
ment projects, or legislative seats that were key to what has been referred 
to as the second colonial occupation.27
ORGANIC GRO W TH  RATHER TH A N  
CULTURAL AND CLASS WARLARE
The East African Institute for Social Research (EAISR), under Audrey Rich­
ards, was at the center of much of this reimagination of Uganda and 
Buganda. Seeing an African city and country as a center of adolescent matu­
ration was not an obvious metaphor for social scientists. Anthropologists 
elsewhere in the world had, after all, emphasized a timeless world of culture
27 For Kenya, see Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925- 
1952 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
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and “tradition.”28 Even in the context of Northern Rhodesia’s industrializ­
ing copper belt, Richards’s earlier ethnography portrayed local people 
as part of a poor but integrated cultural system that persisted with little 
inclination toward dramatic transformation.29 Audrey Richards came to 
Uganda in 1944 after building on an impressive career at the Rhodes- 
Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia. She was immediately impressed 
both by Uganda’s relative affluence and ease, compared not simply to 
Northern Rhodesia but to wartime Britain. Her initial program threw her 
into contact with Buganda’s remarkably developed indigenous social sec­
tor, as she visited with nurses, discussed theology (presumably in English) 
with schoolchildren, and realized that she lacked enough dresses to keep up 
appearances.30 Under her guidance and that of her successor, Lloyd Fallers, 
EAISR sponsored research that led to dissertations and seminar papers, and 
to the institute’s most important early publication, The King’s Men: Lead­
ership and Status in Buganda on the Eve o f Independence, an edited volume 
with essays from several key researchers.31 Published in 1964, after Ugan­
da’s independence, it contained research begun and carried out between 
1953 and 1958, funded by the Carnegie Foundation and the Colonial 
Social Science Research Fund. Initially framed as a collaborative and poten­
tially comparative study of leadership, it saw so much complexity in 
Buganda as to offer “too many variables” for systematic comparisons, and 
thus became an exploration of the kingdom’s society and politics during a 
time of political tension, struggle, and transformation. The published ver­
sion offered an anthropological vision of Buganda, but the research and 
conferences that led to it included work by historians such as D. A. Low 
and Kenneth Ingham, political scientists such as Cranford Pratt and David
28 See, for discussion, Peter Mandler, Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won 
the Second World War and Lost the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
19 See Audrey I. Richards, Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: An Economic 
Study o f the Bemba Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); in contrast to Hor- 
tense Powdermaker, Copper Town: Changing Africa (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), or the earlier Uganda-centered work of Lucy Mair, An African People in the Twen­
tieth Century (New York: Russell and Russell, 1934).
30 On Richards, see Megan Vaughan and Henrietta Moore, Cutting Down Trees: Gender, 
Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province o f Zambia, 1890-1990 
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1994), and Lyn Schumaker, Africanizing Anthropology: 
Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making o f Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa (Dur­
ham: Duke University Press, 2001). On Ugandan conditions, see Richards to “Dearie,” 6 
August 1944, Richards papers 18/4, London School of Economics special collections, 
London.
31 L. A. Fallers, ed., The King’s Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve o f 
Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
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Apter, religion experts F. Welbourn and John Taylor, and, significantly, psy­
chologists Mary Ainsworth and Leonard Ainsworth.
L. A. Fallers’s introduction made clear that this study departed signifi­
cantly from conventional analyses that might focus on colonial interven­
tions and African traditions. Instead he noted quite accurately that 
Buganda’s leaders had consistently taken on aspects of modernity for them­
selves, rather than seeing them as alien. Continuities—a sort of organic 
growth—rather than a colonial or modern rupture defined Buganda’s social 
and political experiences.32 Researchers from Audrey Richards to her junior 
colleagues then proceeded to explore what it meant for a people to, in the 
eyes of political anthropologists and psychologists, grow up. Working with 
Ganda researchers such as S. B. K. Musoke, F. K. Kamoka, and many oth­
ers, Fallers described Buganda as a dynamic society, with social mobility 
rather than just inherited status and with occupational diversity and com­
plex institutions. The expansion of these into, for example, a Uganda Pro­
tectorate Department of Hydrological Services, was thus less a dramatic 
transformation than a maturation. As for the social and physical mobility 
sometimes seen as marking modernity, he noted that in Buganda “mobility 
on a very substantial scale is nothing new. ” 33
Mobility, though, especially the sort that led to high status, could be 
difficult to achieve. Audrey Richards’s essay, which drew not simply on life 
histories and memories but on surveys and interviews with young people, 
described how parents sent their children away at some point between the 
ages of three and seven so that the children would receive a stricter upbring­
ing than parents might provide, and so that those children might acquire 
useful connections, or indeed be useful connections, between the parents 
who sent them and the sponsors who took them in. Older children, if prom­
ising, were sent into even more challenging environments as pages, servants, 
concubines, or wives for chiefs, ministers, or even the king. These positions 
could involve dramatic danger and punishment. But they also offered real 
opportunities for achievement, and thus the child or adolescent was obliged 
to accept punishment gratefully. Unsurprisingly, given such expectations, 
“hatred and jealousy of the father is recognized in Ganda institutions” since 
“a man can only achieve . . . authority by ousting his father . . , ” 34 Politi­
cally, Richards argued, this meant that young pages and servants had to
32 Fallers, “Introduction,” King’s Men, 9.
33 Fallers with S. B. K. Musoke, “Social Mobility, Traditional and Modern,” King’s Men, 
159.
34 Richards, “Authority Patterns in Traditional Buganda,” in Fallers, King’s Men, 
260-66.
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show extreme deference—“creeping along the verandah of the lord’s house 
. . .  [he] kneels to greet his superior and agrees with whatever the latter may 
say” as well as offering “flattery” and “obsequious praise.” Otherwise, the 
youth would be seen as seeking to supplant his or her senior.35
Richards sketched these patterns carefully as background for a subse­
quent chapter, where their relevance to the politics of Buganda in a turbu­
lent decade was made clear. “Most psychologists,” she argued, “would 
claim that attitudes to authority are based on the patterns formed . . .  in 
early childhood.”36 Pretended flattery and obedience overlying a reality of 
intense meritocratic competition in a highly mobile society of fearful and 
potentially vulnerable authorities, she implied, was rooted in older political 
forms and persisted as a standard cultural expectation, enforced with dev­
astating violence.
Richards went further, though. She emphasized not simply that atti­
tudes formed in childhood shaped ideas of authority, but that in Buganda’s 
historical experience, the student activists at King’s College Budo in 1941 
became fixed in a pattern of alliances that continued for decades. In other 
words, the “adolescent politics” condemned by Bishop Stuart was rooted 
in the experiences of actual adolescents. The region’s political turmoil, with 
grievances over cotton prices, complaints about the pace of Africanization, 
rejection of closer union with Kenya, and anger over the governor’s inter­
vention in appointments to offices in both Buganda and the protectorate, 
thus boiled down to a psychological issue.
Significantly implicit in Richards’s analysis was the conclusion that just 
as Ganda parents did not make their children happy by giving them what 
they asked for, but instead used force to keep order and build success, no 
amount of dialogue, mediation, or negotiation by Britain was likely to pro­
duce social peace. Indeed, Ganda society demanded struggle, competition, 
and sometimes pretense, slander, and flattery to function and to allow new 
leaders to emerge.
A subsequent essay by Leonard Doob, based on an explicitly psycho­
logical survey of “leaders” and “followers,” made the social psychology of 
this vision even more explicit, so much so that it overwhelmed the more 
usual political issues or programs in explaining behavior. In his surveys, the 
single most dramatic difference between leaders and followers was their 
analysis of a psychologically provocative stick drawing. Leaders, when
35 Ibid., 271.
36 Richards, “Traditional Values and Current Political Behaviour,” in Fallers, King’s Men, 
295.
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shown the drawing, noted routinely: “son . . . dislikes the father.” Follow­
ers, he asserted, never offered such an interpretation.37
Working in the middle of political crisis, and reporting directly both to 
British officials of the resident’s office of Buganda and to the governor of 
Uganda, as well as providing background papers and ongoing interpreta­
tion and context for the visiting constitutional expert Sir Keith Hancock, 
the Makerere academics’ perspectives on political culture were critically 
important. Specific individuals did seek to deploy economic or conventional 
class-based analyses of Buganda, but were met with scathing prepublication 
critiques by Audrey Richards.38 The result was a working model of Ugan­
dan politics that marginalized economic issues. Earlier clashes, such as the 
1945 general strike or 1949 agitation over cotton prices, had led to concrete 
reforms after officials acknowledged (if only in internal documents) the jus­
tice of activists’ complaints about inadequate wages and cotton prices in 
the context of war inflation and a noncompetitive cotton system. Next door 
in Kenya, Mau Mau activists explicitly voiced their opposition to racially 
exclusive policies regarding land ownership, presenting clear, easily under­
stood grievances. Both economic complaints and accusations of exploita­
tion could at times render British officials defensive and vulnerable. African 
activists occasionally referred to such issues. Yet such concerns were not 
at the center of imperial political debate in the 1950s in Uganda; British 
interpreters’ explanations of events and tensions maintained that political 
mobilization was psychological, rooted in political immaturity, a personal 
issue that needed to be resolved by closer British engagement in develop­
mental politics and institutions.39
Uganda’s own propagandists did not necessarily accept these charac­
terizations of themselves as adolescent and of their rebellion and struggles 
as signs of immaturity. Working with British leftists, Ignatius Musazi and 
his colleagues in the Cotton Growers’ Association, and then in the Uganda 
National Congress, denounced specific exploitative and unfair policies, 
focusing first on cotton prices and ginning policy, then extending their cri­
tique into questions of ministries and ultimately, by the late 1950s, calls for 
self-government. More scathingly, Bataka Union activists, notably Sema- 
kula Mulumba, provided litanies of specific abuses tied to British rule. Such
37Doob, “Leaders, Followers and Attitudes Toward Authority,” in Fallers, King’s Men 
341-45.
38 Audrey Richards’s comments on work by H. West, in Richards Papers 6/17; on T. V. 
Sathyamurthy in Richards 6/3 and Richards’s notes on manuscript by Christopher Wrig- 
ley, 1957, Richards Papers 6/2.
39 Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis.”
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activists offered a genuinely Ganda vision of political ethics and citizenship, 
with a distinctive vision of rights and responsibilities and even accessible, 
participatory governance.40
Within a rhetoric of adolescence, though, British experts rejected such 
complaints as superficial and irrelevant. Investigative commissioners con­
cluded after the 1945 and 1949 uprisings that unrest happened in part 
because Britain, distracted by the war, had failed to provide an ideal form 
of close paternal guidance. British governors and church figures not only 
saw Buganda’s king as an unruly youth, but also read his youth onto 
Buganda’s people more generally, whether discussing his marriage plans 
and difficulties, or attempting to understand Buganda’s political leadership 
through their school records and relations with mission patrons.41 Some 
experts went even further. The influential canon Herbert Grace, who had 
headed King’s College Budo during the youth of key political activists 
before moving to Achimota and eventually retiring to the UK, wrote chid- 
ingly to Buganda’s prime minister, Mikaeri Kawalya-Kaggwa, rejecting 
Kawalya-Kaggwa’s analysis of the trouble as economic and asserting 
instead that the issue was simply one of “educated, intelligent young men.” 
He advised that “you can’t repress this movement—it will grow even more 
as your soldiers return and the more who are educated the more this move­
ment will grow. . . . This young Africa is an explosive force and though the 
numbers may be small, it will have growing power and it all depends how 
it is treated now whether it becomes a curse or a blessing.”42
Grace continued his letter to complain of “half educated young men,” 
asserting they needed more, not less, intervention if they were to be guided 
into the “right paths” that would allow them to build Uganda rather than 
engage in politics, anti-imperial struggle, or calls for rights, justice, account­
ability, or independence. This rhetoric worked not simply because it 
allowed British actors to defend their own actions in Buganda, but also 
because it corresponded to some degree to the realities of the Ugandan 
experience. Junior men, lacking offices and the respect of seniority, did 
organize within Uganda, within associations that ranged from the Motor 
Drivers’ Association to the Bataka Union and the Cotton Growers’ Associa­
tion. These activists protested against chiefs and British alike. Yet their 
rebellion was not the simple opposition to the status quo implied by observ­
ers’ denunciations of adolescence or immature ambition and ignorance. It
40 See Summers, “Grandfathers, Grandsons.”
41 H. M. Grace to Bishop Stuart, 1 August 1948 and H. M. Grace to A. Sempa, 14 March 
1946 in File on the Disturbances, CBMS A/T. 3/2 Box 281, SOAS special collections.
42 H. M. Grace to M. Kawalya Kagwa, 17 January 1946, A/T. 3/2 Box 281, CBMS.
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was often a struggle for opportunities and offices rather than against 
oppressors or exploiters. Rhetoric about youth and maturing adolescence 
allowed such positive aspects of the struggle to take center stage. Especially 
when explaining educated, elite youth and Baganda landowners, this lan­
guage of adolescence interpreted protest as ambition, not opposition, and 
avoided permanently dividing the country.
The portrayal of Baganda and Buganda as adolescent people in an ado­
lescent nation did not block conflict, but it allowed analysts and interpreters 
to present major upheaval as petty. In his influential work on Lesotho, 
James Ferguson described a modern development ideology and program 
awkwardly as an “anti-politics machine.”43 Within Uganda, though, it is 
significant that this developmentalist anti-politics machine required a lan­
guage not simply of expertise and international technical high modernism 
and progress (ideas that have to date been emphasized in such discussions) 
but also a metaphor of youth that helped contain and delegitimize struggle, 
reshaping the very real politics and protests of the time. In doing so, it 
allowed the stressed, post-World War II British Empire to deflect both local 
and international attention from just how little cash, material, and input it 
had to offer as resources for a high-modernist development policy. With 
their emphasis on psychology and personal development, British academics 
and planners also kept the focus of Uganda’s politics on identity—on who 
the maturing adolescent really was—rather than on questions of power, 
justice, or inequity, whether within Buganda or in Buganda’s relations with 
Uganda and Britain.
UGANDANS’ CHALLENGES
At times, Ugandans challenged these characterizations. The Uganda 
National Congress rejected a politics grounded in a youthful identity. 
Instead, it pursued rights in an explicitly political framework easily recog­
nizable to more conventional students of political development and democ­
racy. UNC members wrote petitions; they sought electoral office; they held 
mass meetings; they deployed the press; and, rejected from key offices, they 
pursued parallel structures that had at least the general appearance of repre­
sentative governance. And by the late 1950s, they had become the spear­
head of Uganda’s demands for independence, putting forward a motion
43 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine.
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for Uganda’s self-government and independence to Uganda’s Legislative 
Assembly.
Yet when engaging in imperial debates dominated by metaphors of 
youth, prominent activists found metaphors of maturation inescapable; 
rather than rejecting them entirely, they reinterpreted their implications. 
Instead of seeing maturation as an apolitical, organic, biosocial phenome­
non, they emphasized that it was learned. Senior politician Y. S. Bamutta 
put forward the motion for self-government in April of 1957 using this 
shaded language of childhood and youth. British officials had noted 
increasing political activity in Uganda, mocking these initiatives by noting 
that the “infant mortality [of parties was] high.” Bamutta argued that “for 
a country to grow and improve and to run its affairs it must be given 
responsibility. If it is given the responsibility it will learn.” He acknowl­
edged that mistakes were likely, but that “we have been waiting for the last 
60 years. You cannot train a child to walk and give it a stick to lean on. 
That way it will never be able to walk. You must let it try and let it fall 
down and then it will pick itself up and thus will learn how to walk.” 
Apprenticeships, clerkships, and educational institutions must give way to 
real authority and accountability. Learning, Bamutta believed, happened 
when the youthful nation faced its own consequences, without protection 
from an imperial sponsor that seemed far too reluctant to let go. Others 
continued Bamutta’s argument, as his motion for independence was 
seconded by D. L. K. Lubogo and expanded on by Dr. E. M. K. Muwazi, 
who combined the available metaphors to assert:
I know we shall tumble and fall, like a toddler, but of course, that 
is inevitable. I know we shall try and get up again after tumbling 
and falling and it is no good anyone telling us to walk slowly. 
Circumstances, sir, do not permit us to walk slowly any more . . . 
when you want to learn how to swim you must get into the water.
You cannot learn to swim simply by staying outside the water and 
if we are to learn how to govern ourselves we must get into govern­
ment ourselves and learn the art of self-government..  ,44
Many Ugandan members of the Legislative Assembly struggled over 
whether that growing mastery would come from an organic process of mat­
uration, or an active process of learning. Z. C. K. Mungonya, who held 
the portfolio of minister of land tenure, sounded distinctly British as he
44 Legislative Assembly Debates (April 1957) in CO 822/1510, National Archives.
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emphasized the need for maturity and asserted that “every thinking African 
would agree that it is very unwise for the Government simply to establish 
self-government and thrust so much responsibility upon the people who are 
not ready or competent to carry it out.” G. B. K. Magezi spoke more poeti­
cally, but even more fearfully, noting that trees that grew fast died quickly, 
and worrying that too much influence from Buganda meant that quick inde­
pendence would degenerate into Ugandans sending telegrams to London 
asking for Britain to come and save them. Instead of rushing into self- 
governance, he concluded, “we have got to let it grow naturally and attain 
it at the right time . . ,”45
It was, though, an academic associated with Makerere, Kenneth 
Ingham, who patronizingly congratulated everyone in the Legislative 
Assembly on their speeches before reclaiming the metaphors of youth that 
the Congress party had tried to seize. He observed that “metaphors have 
been employed of children learning to run and they cannot learn to run 
without falling. With that . . .  I agree. On the other hand, the difference 
between a child falling and sustaining slight bodily damage is a difference 
of a very great degree from a minister of the Government making a com­
plete mess of his particular portfolio and ruining possibly the lives of a 
million people in this country.” Ingham opposed the motion for self- 
government.
While going down to defeat, Congress politicians (notably, Y. B. 
Mugoma) voiced the fundamental inadequacy of such simple obstruction­
ism, observing that the British had had 60 years to teach—and arguing 
that without political pressure for self-governance, Britain’s failure to teach 
might well continue, providing an excuse for continued domination and 
exploitation.
CONCLUSION
Whether sincere or tactical, the metaphor offered by Ingham and others 
in the administration, academic, and clerical worlds of Uganda who saw 
Ugandans as restless, demanding adolescents not yet mature enough, or 
educated enough, for self-governance, was a temporarily effective language. 
Ultimately, though, it gave way to the realities of British weakness and 
Ugandan politics. In the aftermath of independence, its echoes offered an
45 Ibid.
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“I told you so” during challenging years of political stalemate, abuses, and 
collapse.
Turning the discussion of independence into a metaphorical examina­
tion of childhood, adolescence, and parenting had sidestepped any number 
of issues critical to Uganda’s future, ranging from class conflict to struggles 
between regions and debates over “traditional” rulers and laws. The meta­
phor of adolescence was convenient and flexible, facilitating peace and 
polite discourse among elites. It pushed back disorderly, divisive clashes of 
interests that could emerge in overt political contention and debate. It 
failed, though, to offer ordinary Ugandans a way to act democratically in 
pursuit of their aims.
Childhood and youth are powerful metaphors. They can persuade. 
They can deflect. They can mobilize, or shape, empathic responses to crises. 
Ideas of childhood and youth are rarely simply questions of biology or neu­
trality. Instead, they have at times provided frames that policymakers and 
activists use to understand and intervene in events. They work to privilege 
visions of developmental growth and to delegitimate explicit discussions of 
power and politics. Ideas of childhood and diminished responsibility inhibit 
or evade accountability. The Congress politicians of the 1950s saw them­
selves as adults. Emphasizing immaturity and making excuses for perform­
ance diminished these activists’ accountability and, in metaphors of the 
time used by Ugandan activists, blocked democracy in favor of fostering a 
lingering protectorate of cripples. Instead of emphasizing politics or a need 
to respond to popular mobilization and demands, this strategy offered pro­
gressive British colonial development planners in the 1940s and 1950s an 
overtly non-racial, non-Marxist opportunity—an apolitical means to justify 
and enforce their imperial guidance.
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